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ABSTRACT
Objective: We sought to present a model of privacy disposition and its development based on qualitative re-
search on privacy considerations in the context of emerging health technologies.
Materials and Methods: We spoke to 108 participants across 44 interviews and 9 focus groups to understand
the range of ways in which individuals value (or do not value) control over their health information. Transcripts
of interviews and focus groups were systematically coded and analyzed in ATLAS.ti for privacy considerations
expressed by respondents.
Results: Three key findings from the qualitative data suggest a model of privacy disposition. First, participants
described privacy related behavior as both contextual and habitual. Second, there are motivations for and deter-
rents to sharing personal information that do not fit into the analytical categories of risks and benefits. Third,
philosophies of privacy, often described as attitudes toward privacy, should be classified as a subtype of moti-
vation or deterrent.
Discussion: This qualitative analysis suggests a simple but potentially powerful conceptual model of privacy
disposition, or what makes a person more or less private. Components of privacy disposition are identifiable and
measurable through self-report and therefore amenable to operationalization and further quantitative inquiry.
Conclusions: We propose this model as the basis for a psychometric instrument that can be used to identify
types of privacy dispositions, with potential applications in research, clinical practice, system design, and policy.
Key words: privacy, confidentiality, patient data privacy, disclosure, social values
INTRODUCTION
Information technologies for moving, copying, and storing personal
information electronically are increasingly ubiquitous in American
life. The associated rapid movement of personal information allows
us to stay in touch with more people than ever before, facilitates the
efficient purchasing and distribution of goods, saves lives through
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more informed and timely healthcare delivery, and supports the de-
velopment and testing of new innovations.1,2 Along with these bene-
fits, information technologies also cause disruptions and create new
problems. In addition to presenting new sources of data security
risks, information technologies have created, and will continue to
create, new social situations in which our assumptions about privacy
and confidentiality will be challenged, inevitably leading to feelings
of discomfort, threat, and mistrust.2–5 In efforts to mitigate these
effects, scholars and professionals concerned with electronic data
sharing have sought to understand and characterize attitudes and
values of consumers and the general public.6 The resulting literature
shows how challenging it has been to develop measures that mean-
ingfully capture attitudes toward privacy.6,7 As the impacts of infor-
mation technologies intensify and current events create more public
awareness and anxiety about privacy, increasing numbers of stake-
holders across disciplines and industries will find a need for tools
that identify and characterize attitudes and values regarding data
sharing. Here, we present a model of disposition toward privacy, or
privacy disposition, focused on the context of health, healthcare,
and emerging technologies in the United States. Our privacy disposi-
tion model is based on qualitative research and will serve as the basis
for a quantitative psychometric instrument that measures individu-
als’ sensitivity to disclosure of personal health information. The
model has the potential to be used to develop measures for other
specific contexts such as disclosure of financial information or shar-
ing via social media.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The ambiguity of “privacy” has inspired many scholars across di-
verse fields to define, operationalize, or measure it. Existing scholar-
ship on privacy addresses many facets of the concept, from privacy
as a legal concept8 to the kinds of social and psychological factors
that contribute to privacy-related attitudes and behaviors.9,10 Nis-
senbaum11 suggests that disparate descriptions of privacy can be un-
derstood as a whole by considering privacy as a product of
“contextual integrity” in which information flows conform to
expectations and norms regarding disclosure of information. Thus,
the theory of contextual integrity suggests that privacy is a feature of
sociotechnical systems navigated and understood by individuals
according to shared norms as well as personal expectations.11–13
Drawing on Nissenbaum’s notion of privacy, our study was
designed to identify the diversity of personal expectations and values
regarding the flow of health information. Connecting this idea to
the existing literature on attitudes toward privacy requires theoriz-
ing and operationalizing the concept of “private-ness” or “how pri-
vate you are,” colloquially treated much like a personality trait.
Westin and colleagues developed one of the most well-known
attempts to operationalize and measure such a concept, and between
1978 and 2004 created an index of “privacy concern” (eg, fundamen-
talist, pragmatist, unconcerned) based on a short questionnaire.7,14,15
Others have suggested expanding Westin’s three clusters of privacy
concern into four16 or five17 privacy personas. Internet Users’ Infor-
mation Privacy Concerns18 scale has emerged as a validated and
widely used privacy scale, which is based on a longer questionnaire.
Preibusch6 reviewed the Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns
and about a half dozen other validity-tested privacy scales19–24 and
discussed the benefits and limitations of their use.
Many of these measures have been shown to be poor predictors
of behavior,3,25,26 pointing to a phenomenon called the “privacy
paradox,”27,28 in which reported attitudes toward privacy are found
to be inconsistent with privacy-related behavior. The model of
“privacy calculus” is one way that scholars have sought to make
sense of the privacy paradox. Theories of privacy calculus describe
behaviors related to privacy as the outcome of how individuals
weigh costs and benefits of disclosing information or using privacy
settings.29 Some scholars have suggested modifications to this
model, such as “privacy cynicism,”30 “privacy fatigue,”31 and
“psychological ownership.”32 The privacy calculus approach has
also been criticized for being based on an assumption of rational ac-
tion that is not borne out in empirical studies.33
In addition to low predictive validity, these models of privacy
have been limited in the extent to which they integrate context as a
factor in privacy-related behaviors. Some privacy attitude scales
have been adapted to refer directly to certain information-sharing
scenarios34,35 while the “privacy calculus” approach incorporates
context insofar as individuals are theorized to weigh specific risks
and benefits. Researchers and scholars have adapted these theories
and measures of privacy attitudes and behaviors to particular tech-
nological contexts, such as self-disclosure on social media,36–38 use
of GPS-enabled apps,39,40 and use of electronic health records.41
These studies provide insight into individuals’ attitudes and behavior
in certain contexts. However, the expanding data ecosystem raises
the question of how individuals conceptualize and protect informa-
tion privacy across a variety of contexts.
The emergence of data-generating health technologies, such as
direct-to-consumer genetic testing,42 mobile health apps,43 and
wearable devices44 that capture granular-level data, coupled with
large-scale precision medicine initiatives, such as the All of Us
research study,45 further highlight the importance of understanding
the intersection of privacy, emerging technologies, and health infor-
mation sharing. At the same time, consumer privacy regulations,
such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation,46
have raised awareness and anxiety about the movement of personal
information. Together, these factors create a pressing need to under-
stand and respond to public attitudes toward sharing personal
health information when deploying new data-generating health tech-
nologies. Thus, our qualitative study was designed to query individ-
ual perspectives on health information disclosure, specifically in the
context of emerging health technologies. Here, we present our quali-
tative findings and conceptual model of privacy disposition that
emerged from our analysis, which serves as the basis for a psycho-
metric assessment tool currently in development.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants of this study (1) completed either a focus group or indi-
vidual interview, (2) provided demographic information, and (3)
completed a companion survey comprising various measures related
to health information and privacy (survey data not reported here).
All recruitment procedures and study measures were reviewed and
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Cal-
ifornia, San Diego (protocol #160156).
Sampling
Our prior work on privacy attitudes, combined with a review of the
existing privacy literature, suggested that new and changing atti-
tudes may be developing around health privacy with regard to mo-
bile devices, online and social media environments, genetic testing,
biobanking, and other emerging health technology contexts.
As such, our sampling frame was theoretically driven rather than
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focused on statistical generalizability.47 Specifically, we sought to
capture a wide spectrum of experiences, expectations, and under-
standings of privacy.
We recruited individuals for focus groups and interviews from a
number of sources to provide a broad sample for the study. These
groups included several patient cohorts, including a breast health re-
search network, an adult HIV research network, pediatric chronic
disease patients from a children’s hospital, and members of an on-
line patient social network. We also recruited from community
groups, including a Pacific Islander community organization, a legal
advocacy organization for disadvantaged workers, a church, a char-
ter middle school, and a leadership and academic support organiza-
tion for disadvantaged adolescents. These groups were chosen
because of an expectation that individuals in these cohorts would
likely have had experience with these new forms of data or that they
may have had specific experiences with and concerns about health
privacy. For example, chronic disease patients might have special-
ized experience with emerging technologies such as genetic or geno-
mic testing, members of historically underrepresented or
underserved groups may have distinct concerns about disclosure of
information, and school-aged adolescents are likely to have expo-
sure to online and social media environments.
Measures
Interview and focus group protocols were developed based on
results of a comprehensive review of literature on health privacy and
reanalysis of data from 2 previous studies that addressed expecta-
tions about the privacy of health-related information.2,48 Two pilot
focus group sessions were conducted with undergraduate students to
further refine the protocol. The final semistructured protocol probed
participant attitudes about several types of health and personal in-
formation and their privacy beliefs and behaviors in relation to those
types of information. While separate versions of the protocol were
developed for focus groups and individual interviews, both versions
covered the same topics, albeit with differences in phrasing and pro-
cedure to account for the format of administration. Example items
from the protocol can be found in Supplementary Appendix 1.
Data collection
Contact information for interested individuals was provided to
study investigators from site-specific cohort liaisons. Potential par-
ticipants were either recruited by the site-specific cohort liaison (a
nonstudy team member who contacted participants and coordinated
their participation) or by a study team member for those cohorts
that did not have a dedicated liaison. Our sample, therefore, com-
prises a series of 6 convenience samples, in which recruitment was
conducted with assistance from these liaisons.
Focus groups and interviews took place between June 2016 and
April 2017. Seven of 9 focus groups were conducted before the inter-
views to inform development of the interview guides. Two focus
groups with individuals living with HIV were conducted later in the
study to capture unique insights about health information privacy
offered by these individuals. Focus groups were 90 minutes in length
and took place at the University of California, San Diego, or a com-
munity location in San Diego County appropriate to the cohort. Fo-
cus groups were conducted by 1 of 4 facilitators. All participants
provided written consent before the start of the study or signed pa-
rental consent and assent if the participant was an adolescent. All fo-
cus groups were audio and video recorded except the HIV cohorts,
which were only audio recorded.
Interviews were up to 60 minutes in length and were conducted
in person or over the phone by 1 of 3 interviewers. All participants
provided either oral consent or written parental consent and oral as-
sent (if the participant was an adolescent) before participation. All
interviews were audio recorded.
Qualitative coding and analysis
Audio and video recordings were professionally transcribed. Tran-
scripts were reviewed by members of the study team to ensure accu-
racy of the transcription and to redact any personally identifiable
information.
To develop the code book, 7 independent coders were assigned
to independently review 2 transcripts each (25% of the corpus).
Coders were instructed to highlight passages that suggest a privacy-
influencing factor or any reason that an informant provided for
making a decision about privacy. The coders collectively analyzed
these factors and 27 thematic codes were identified. These codes and
8 section codes made up the codebook (Supplementary Appendix 2).
Three independent coders completed the systematic coding of
the corpus according to the codebook. Each week during the coding
period, 3 interviews were assigned to 2 coders who met to go over
and come to consensus on the coding. This consensus coding helped
to maintain consistency among coders and over time.49 A total of 10
(19%) transcripts were consensus coded. Because coders must come
to agreement in the process of consensus coding, we did not calcu-
late intercoder reliability for these transcripts.
RESULTS
A total of 108 individuals participated across 9 focus groups and 44
interviews. The sample was predominantly female (60.2%) and par-
ticipants ranged in age from 13 to 82 years old (SD ¼ 20.0). See Ta-
ble 1 for further sociodemographic characterization of the
participants.
The results reported here are based on an analysis of the 10 codes
most relevant to when, how, and why respondents disclose health
information. These codes were named access control, consequences
of disclosure, institutional mechanisms, privacy practices, reasons to
share–altruistic, reasons to share–personal, safe/unsafe, sensitive
info–health, stigmatized, and TMI (too much information). The
working definitions of these codes are listed in Table 2. Quotes asso-
ciated with these codes were further sorted according to concurrent
coding with codes named interpersonal relations and institutional
relations. Ultimately, we grouped the content of these codes into 4
broad categories that form the foundation of our model of privacy
disposition: (1) reasons for sharing, (2) reasons against sharing, (3)
interpersonal habits, and (4) institutional habits.
Contextual disclosure habits
The categories we named interpersonal habits and institutional hab-
its include reported behavior, practices, or rules of thumb for when
and how to share personal health information. Interpersonal habits
encompasses the ways in which people share information with peo-
ple they know personally or encounter in person. Some interper-
sonal habits were mentioned in the context of a conversation about
what it means to be “a private person” and therefore directly
reflected perceptions of “private-ness” as a personality characteris-
tic. For example, one man described himself as “not private” be-
cause, he said, “I’m more about trying to address [an issue] than
hide it or be ashamed of it or whatever. I’m pretty much an open
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book” (CG-003). In contrast, another interviewee described herself
as private, explaining, “I just tend not to share everything personal
with a lot of people. I keep things to myself” (CG-004). Other inter-
personal habits were specific statements about how and when
respondents communicated health information with other individu-
als. For example, one man stated, “It’s right in my [dating] profile,
I’ve been [HIV] positive for 36 years. That’s my health
information,” (FG-P4). Another kind of response focused on who
the respondent did or did not share information with, like the
woman who reported, “Nobody around me knows what’s going on
with my health, just my mom” (CG-048).
Institutional habits include reported behavior, practices, or rules
of thumb used in situations in which disclosed information may be
recorded and used by institutions. For example, one patient group
member told us, “I have no compunctions about either withholding
information, or just flat out lying, because [insurance agents] will
misuse the information if I give it to them” (PT-028). Some of these
practices were specific to medical information. For example, one re-
spondent who was highly familiar with biobanking described the
information she has asked for before donating blood for research,
commenting, “Deidentification is very important, number one, I
think. I would like to know how long the sample’s going to be
stored, who has access to the sample, actually even how it’s going to
be stored. Is it whole blood or [are] they thinning down or getting
plasma, all that stuff.” (PT-023) However, many behaviors men-
tioned were examples of cautionary steps taken with digital data in
general, such as the man who reported, “I’m very conscious about
turning location off, not just on my devices, but different members
of my family, their devices” (PT-051). Table 3 presents a list of spe-
cific behaviors we collected from comments like these.
Some respondents who described themselves as “very private” in
interpersonal contexts also reported conservative or closed habits
with respect to disclosing information in institutional settings. How-
ever, self-description as “private” or “not so private” did not always
match the behaviors they reported in institutional contexts, which
was not necessarily a contradiction. For example, when asked if he
thought of himself as a private person, one respondent said, “Not re-
ally [. . .because] I’m social. People know about me and everything.
I’m not scared to know what people know about me” (PT-025).
Yet, he also reported keeping his Facebook account private and
sometimes reading the terms and conditions for apps. In contrast, a
mother of a chronically ill child described herself as private and
reported cautious privacy practices in most settings, except when it
came to sharing medical information about her child, commenting,
“We really wouldn’t [share his medical information] if we had a
choice, but because we’re in this circumstance, we’re giving up a lit-
tle bit of risk to hopefully benefit at the end of it” (PT-050). These
examples suggest that, for some individuals, interpersonal and insti-
tutional information habits can vary independently.
Reasons for and against sharing
When discussing decisions about when and how to disclose personal
information, respondents referred to not only familiar benefits and
risks or adverse consequences, but also ideas about privacy, emo-
tional responses, and other motivations and deterrents. For example,
respondents did not necessarily connect annoyance with personal-
ized online advertisements with a direct threat to privacy, but this
annoyance was noted as a deterrent to sharing. Conversely, benefits
of sharing, such as helping others with similar conditions, did not
need to be direct or guaranteed to be mentioned several times as rea-
sons to disclose health information. Conceptualizing benefits as
“reasons to share” in our coding process helped us to attend to a
more inclusive set of motivations whether or not they were easily
understood as benefits. As we sorted through the many deterrents
coded with access control, consequences of disclosure, safe/unsafe,
stigmatized, and TMI, we saw that the same logic could be applied.
Therefore, we included a wide selection of reasons for sharing and
reasons against sharing in our lists (outlined in Table 4), encompass-
ing: (1) reasons conventionally described as “risks and benefits” that
have clear and generally agreed-upon impacts on the individual, (2)
feelings and subjective experiences that impact decisions about dis-
closure, and (3) philosophies of privacy that imply support for shar-
ing or reticence. The types of reasons we collected reflect the
emphasis in our interview guide on disclosure of health information.
The ways in which respondents spoke about their reasons for
sharing and reasons against sharing suggest an intuitive shorthand
for characterizing contexts as private or not private in the face of un-
certainty. We have come to think of this as a sort of privacy essen-
tialism in which individuals appear to settle on static understandings
Table 1. Sample demographics (N¼ 108)
Participation type
Focus group 64 (59.3)
Interview 44 (40.7)
Female 65 (60.2)
Age, y 40.356 20.0 (13-82)
Hispanic/Latinoa 28 (26.2)
Raceb
American Indian/Alaska Native 3 (3.2)
Asian 10 (10.6)
Black or African American 8 (8.5)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 8 (8.5)
White 63 (67.0)
Mixed/more than 1 race 2 (2.1)
Marital statusa
Single 62 (57.9)
Married/in a domestic partnership 36 (33.6)
Divorced/widowed 9 (8.1)
Highest educationa
Completed 11 or fewer years
(majority adolescents still in school)
29 (27.1)
Graduated from high school or GED completed 12 (11.2)
Graduated from 2-year college 13 (12.1)
Graduated from 4-year college 21 (19.6)
Some postcollege education 11 (10.3)
Master’s degree 17 (15.9)
Professional degree or PhD 4 (3.7)
Approximate annual household incomec
Under $25 000 28 (29.2)
$25 000-$49 999 20 (20.8)
$50 000-$99 999 22 (22.9)
$100 000-$149 999 12 (12.5)
$150 000þ 14 (14.5)
Self-reported health status
Very good 24 (22.2)
Good 52 (48.1)
Average 26 (24.1)
Poor 6 (5.6)
Very Poor 0 (0.0)
Values are n (%) or mean6 SD (range).
aMissing data for 1 participant.
bMissing data for 14 participants.
cMissing data for 12 participants.
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of circumstances as private or not private. For example, discussions
about risks and consequences of disclosure often revolved around
assumptions, generalized impressions, or secondhand stories that
made no definitive statement about the likelihood of a bad outcome.
One interviewee shared her general impression: “If my name’s on it,
it just feels like that information can be abused and then I directly
take the hit for it, in some regard” (CG-058). Concerns about dis-
crimination in insurance coverage were sometimes illustrated with
stories like this one, offered by one focus group participant:
I actually know a lot of younger people in their 20s and 30s who
have a family history of polycystic kidney disease or whatever,
and their parents have taken them to Mexico to be tested be-
cause they didn’t want it in a database here in the US to basically
tank their chances for insurance, for life insurance. I think you
Table 2. Names and definitions of codes selected for incorporation into privacy disposition model
Thematic Code Name Definition
Access control Discussion of control over access to and content of electronic data. Includes discussion of who should or should not
have access or the ability to change the content.
Consequences of disclosure Discussion of potential negative outcomes of data sharing on self or others.
Institutional mechanisms Discussion about regulations/infrastructure/policies/laws that exist to protect personal information and respondent’s
level of confidence in regulations or institutions. May be positive, negative, or neutral on the topic of whether such
checks and balances are adequate. Include discussion of informed consent and de-identification procedures.
Institutional relations Discussion of privacy and information sharing in the context of relationships with a company (for profit or nonprofit),
health system, university, research institution, biobank, government, or other institutional entity. Include entities’
motivations or willingness to protect privacy.
Interpersonal relations Discussions of privacy or information sharing in the context of relationships with people (eg, friends, relatives, acquain-
tances, strangers).
Privacy practices Discussion of intentional actions taken to protect privacy (eg, using privacy settings, private browsing, reading privacy
statements, shredding documents, avoiding email for certain purposes, limits on what type of information is posted).
Reasons to share–personal Discussion of personal benefits of sharing information. May include perceived or actual personal benefit (eg, to get bet-
ter care, find others like me, learn more information).
Reasons to share–altruistic Discussion of societal benefits of sharing information (altruistic or for a greater good). May include perceived or actual
societal benefit (eg, contribute to better knowledge, help others, help my community).
Safe/unsafe Discussions of feeling vulnerable or protected with respect to the movement of personal information.
Sensitive info–health Discussions of health information and if it is sensitive relative to other types of information (eg, respondent may or may
not feel health information is sensitive—need to capture discussions either way).
Stigmatized Discussion about sharing or protecting potentially stigmatizing/ embarrassing information. Respondent must point to
the stigmatizing potential of the information—coder should not infer. Includes acknowledgement of others’ attitude
toward this type of information, even if respondent does not agree.
TMI Discussions about when too much electronic information is collected or requested.
TMI: too much information.
Table 3. Contextual disclosure habits
Interpersonal Habits Institutional Habits
Definition: Behaviors, practices, or personal codes related to sharing or
protecting information within interpersonal relationships
Behaviors, practices, or personal codes related to sharing or
protecting information in institutional settings
Examples: • Open with coworkers or acquaintances
• Open with potential romantic partners
• Open with people who see me (because I look sick)
• Open with people who have conditions like mine
• Talk about health with people who are seeking informa-
tion
• Talk about health only when it comes up in conversa-
tion
• Talk about health only with people I trust
• Disclose only select information with friends and family
• Disclose only on a “need to know” basis
• Lie to my friends about my chronic disease
• Tell only my mom about my health
• Discuss my health only with my doctor
• More open with people online than in-person
• Discuss condition with others (eg, friends) when it’s se-
rious or I know exactly what’s going on
• Read terms and conditions or privacy policies
• Lie or obfuscate information
• Do not disclose health information with companies
• Ask about how research information will be stored
• Ask what research information is for
• Deal only with credible health and research institutions
• Bring physical copies of health records rather than send-
ing electronically
• Avoid certain search terms or posting about certain
topics when online
• Avoid online shopping or online banking
• Avoid clicking on online ads
• Clear online browsing history
• Avoid disclosing sensitive information online
• Disable features on apps
• Delete apps that ask for too many permissions
• Disable smartphone GPS
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have to think about where that information is and what the end
result could be when you decide to let people have access to it.
(FG-P1)
This respondent demonstrates that the fears of her younger
acquaintances resonate with her, first by making a very specific story
sound like a notable trend in her social circle (“I know a lot of peo-
ple who. . .”) and then by concluding with a generalized moral about
sharing information (“You have to think. . .”). At the same time, she
does not address the issue of whether her friends’ fears were well-
founded. Indeed, her conclusion accounts for the difficulty of assess-
ing risk—“you have to think about it”—but there is no clear action
indicated one way or the other. Even firsthand stories about the con-
sequences of disclosing information could be dominated by uncer-
tainty. An interviewee discussed her experience of solicitations she
suspects originated from her openness about her health online.
But, I also know that I’m getting a lot of solicitations about do I
want to try this drug? . . . stuff I’ve never heard of. Stuff that re-
ally did sound like “Acme” testing. I get a ton of stuff from Sur-
vey Monkey that I don’t know. Sometimes I look at it and say,
“Why would you even choose me?” It makes me think because
of one little thing that I wrote or checked. (PT-018)
This respondent expresses her discomfort, but also does not have
clear knowledge of what behavior allowed her information to be dis-
closed. Throughout the interview, she used the name “Acme” to de-
note a questionable or nonreputable institution. An experience like
the one described previously could easily inspire a personal rule of
thumb to never share health-related information via the internet,
whether or not solicitation could be shown to be an outcome of
such action. Another respondent expressed just such a conviction
when he said, “If I don’t know for a fact that I can trust them [com-
panies that collect my information], then I’m going to think twice
before I give them anything more” (PT-028).
Respondents discussed experiences as well as feelings (of trust
and safety or mistrust and vulnerability) that might be overlooked
by a narrow focus on risks and benefits. Discussions about personal-
ized ads or communicating with insurance companies, for example,
often brought up negative feelings, such as, “I don’t like that. I feel
like someone is watching me and watching what I’m doing” (PT-
031), or, “I feel somewhat threatened, and I feel very adversarial
with insurance companies. The less information they have, the
better” (PT-047). This last respondent referred to her experience of
suing her insurance company for coverage. Her comment reflects
how emotional responses to previous experiences can strongly influ-
ence behavior in future encounters. A similar dynamic is clear in this
woman’s story: “I decided to join their [Starbuck’s] WiFi, and I got
hacked into. It only took the one experience for me to say, ‘Enough,
no more’” (PT-009). This respondent describes a common emo-
tional reaction to a negative experience that cannot be accounted for
in a privacy calculus that weighs risks and benefits.
Similarly, many respondents described motivations to share in-
formation that did not involve direct benefits to themselves, but the
potential to help others or society in general. Many of these
responses addressed research specifically, such as, “I would hope
that the information that I would provide would help others” (PT-
010), “I think I’m doing good for hopefully the future generations”
(FG-P3), or “I’m really for research. Otherwise, I wouldn’t do this. I
really believe in research” (PT-012). Some respondents saw being
open about their health information as a political act, for example,
“I want the culture around this conversation to change and I need to
be a part of making that change” (CG-052). Others saw sharing as a
way to reach out to others in similar circumstances: “I guess if I am
trying to encourage someone else who has come down with some
horrible disease and they’re not sure what the net result is going to
be, I will mention my situation, [and that] things have turned out
positively” (PT-014).
Table 4. Reasons for and against sharing inclusive of benefits and risks, philosophies of privacy, and emotional factors
Reasons for Sharing Reasons Against Sharing
Conventional • Receive better medical care
• Gain or maintain employment
• Gain or maintain insurance
• Convenience
• Receive social support
• Legal requirement
• Avoid discrimination or loss of benefits
• Avoid stigma or being treated differently
• Prevent tracking, targeting, or information
“used against me”
Emotional/Intangible • Belief in research
• Desire to help others
• Feelings of safety (trust or familiarity; belief in
anonymity, good information security and rules/
regulations; sense of control)
• Desire to demonstrate trustworthiness or other
socially desirable trait
• Desire to take a stand or “change the culture”
• Build community
• Concerns about unspecified unintended conse-
quences
• Negative past experiences
• High value on control of personal information
• Negative or uncomfortable feeling when asked
for too much or inappropriate information
• Lack of trust in the commercial, political, or dis-
respectful motives of others
• Protect others from worry or sadness
• Uncertainty in what could happen with informa-
tion
• Fear of hacking
Philosophies of Privacy • Conviction that privacy does not exist or cannot
be maintained (fatalism)
• Willingness to trade privacy for other benefits
(tradeoff)
• Assumption that privacy is not necessary if one
has no secrets (nothing to hide)
• Conviction that privacy is a kind of human right
or property right (moral right)
• Conviction that maintaining privacy is an indi-
vidual’s responsibility (personal responsibility)
• Assumption that privacy is necessary because
the individual has a secret (something to hide)
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Philosophies of privacy
A set of common ideas about “what privacy is” have been discussed
in the literature on privacy behaviors and attitudes. When preparing
the codebook, we included codes to capture expressions of several
common philosophies of privacy. Table 5 presents the names and
definitions for those that were represented in the transcripts. These
philosophies represent cultural framings50 or shared definitions of
privacy. Our analysis shows how these ideas were discussed as gen-
eralized approaches to disclosure, similar to other reasons for and
against sharing.
Philosophies of privacy coded as fatalism, tradeoff, or nothing to
hide can function as reasons for sharing because they justify disclo-
sure, as in “total privacy doesn’t exist” (FG-C5) or “as long as the
app serves its purpose for me, I guess I’m okay with it” (PT-027) or
“what are they going to use it for? I have nothing to hide” (CG-
055). Privacy philosophies like moral right, personal responsibility,
or something to hide discourage disclosure because they imply a
higher personal value for privacy. When privacy is considered a
moral right, it is elevated to something nearly sacred. As one respon-
dent put it, “You really only have a few things in life. Privacy and in-
tegrity are 2 of them that I find to be important to me” (FG-P3).
The personal responsibility philosophy implies that individuals must
work to maintain privacy if they want it, as in, “In this day and age
I think you have to be a little bit more cautious and private” (PT-
011), or, “If you just throw around information and other stuff like
that just willy nilly, then you’re not going to keep your privacy”
(PT-015). An extreme reading of personal responsibility may even
imply that disclosing information is a breach of duty or a character
flaw. Moreover, those who value their privacy because they feel
they have something to hide might be less willing to disclose any-
thing, or perhaps be more selective about the information they dis-
close. For example, one respondent told us she does not mind
sharing her age because she is proud of it, but “weight is another
problem. I’m overweight, so I don’t like to share that” (PT-012). If
an individual worries about information that they feel must be hid-
den, they may be more cautious when sharing information in gen-
eral.
Participants in our study did not always discuss philosophies of
privacy, and when they did mention them, these were both expres-
sions of beliefs held by the speaker or by others. For example, one
woman attributed a fatalist attitude to her kids and grandkids: “To
them, it’s a matter of fact. I hear all the time, ‘Gram, don’t worry
about it.’ ‘Ma? It’s all right. Don’t worry about it.’ ‘Don’t lose sleep
over it. It just happens’” (PT-022). Like reasons attributed to others,
secondhand expressions of these philosophies inform our under-
standing even when they cannot be attributed to our study partici-
pants.
DISCUSSION
Here, we report results from a qualitative study designed to guide
development of a psychometric instrument to assess individual dif-
ferences in sensitivity toward disclosure of personal health informa-
tion. This study yielded 3 key insights that gave shape to a
conceptual model of privacy disposition on which our instrument
will be based. These insights are the following:
1. Privacy-related behavior is both contextual and habitual. Inter-
viewees described varying sensitivities and distinct privacy-
related behaviors across institutional and interpersonal contexts.
Interviewees described habitual repetition of these behaviors
within each context. Many empirical studies of privacy focus on
particular technological contexts, such as social media or mobile
app use.40,51,52 We asked our respondents about their practices
and habits in interpersonal contexts as well as a broad range of
technological and biomedical contexts, for example, with re-
spect to electronic health records (EHRs), biobanking, and fit-
ness trackers. Therefore, we included habits specific to
interpersonal and institutional relationships as important and
distinct influences on privacy disposition.
2. Motivations and deterrents extend beyond risks and benefits.
The reasons interviewees gave for their privacy-related behaviors
encompassed more than conventional assessment of risks and
benefits. Where the “privacy calculus” approach focuses on risks
and benefits of information disclosure,29 we broaden the scope
to reasons for sharing and reasons against sharing to better cap-
ture the many considerations that we heard about in our inter-
views and focus groups. These considerations included not only
consequences and benefits, but also feelings—including feelings
of trust (encompassing features such as reliability, competence,
or integrity), experiences, preferences, and privacy philosophies.
3. Philosophies of privacy should be classified as motivations or
deterrents. Philosophies of privacy are one type of reasons for or
against sharing that interviewees gave for privacy-related behav-
iors. Existing approaches that focus on privacy attitudes focus
on and prioritize identifying an individual’s philosophy of pri-
vacy, such as privacy as a property right (eg, psychological own-
ership)31; privacy as moral right (eg, privacy fundamentalism)15;
or privacy as no longer existing (eg, privacy cynicism).29 Our
analysis helped us to see these philosophies as a special class of
reasons for or against sharing that may not be held by all indi-
viduals. In addition, these qualitative data suggest that an indi-
vidual may express contradictory privacy philosophies and may
even do so simultaneously. The meaning of such contradictions
is unclear, although examination of other reasons for or against
sharing may offer clarifying insights. Therefore, we incorporate
privacy philosophies into the category of reasons alongside risks,
benefits, and subjective experiences—without elevating any
above the others.
The qualitative analysis presented here suggests a simple but po-
tentially powerful conceptual model of privacy disposition, or what
makes a more or less private person. This model describes privacy
Table 5. Definitions of philosophies of privacy
Philosophies of Privacy Definition
Fatalism Privacy cannot be controlled or does not exist.
Moral right Privacy is a moral right—something that every-
one is entitled to.
Nothing to hide Protection of personal information is unimpor-
tant as long as the information does not in-
clude something sensitive or stigmatizing.
Something to hide Protection of personal information is important
because that information includes something
that is sensitive or stigmatizing.
Personal responsibility Privacy is a personal responsibility; everyone
must work to keep or have privacy if they
want it.
Tradeoff Privacy is something to be traded for desired
goods, services, or conveniences and reflects a
risk/reward or other tradeoff.
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disposition as a function of the 4 categories of influences that we
have described: institutional habits, interpersonal habits, reasons for
sharing, and reasons against sharing. Including contextualized hab-
its helps account for 2 distinct arenas associated with information
privacy. Using the broad categories of reasons for sharing and rea-
sons against sharing builds on existing models that describe concerns
or attitudes toward privacy and the risks and benefits of disclosure
as the main antecedents to privacy-related behaviors. Bringing all
such considerations under the umbrella of reasons allows us to in-
clude in our model the range of motivations and deterrents described
by interviewees without prioritizing them a priori. Future quantita-
tive work may help determine what features are most indicative of
privacy disposition.
This model is specifically designed to describe the factors related
to an individual’s general comfort with disclosure of personal health
information vs an all-encompassing model of the broad construct of
privacy. Nissenbaum11 described privacy as “contextual integrity”:
Where expectations and norms of information flow are not violated,
there is a sense of privacy.53 Our model might be seen as nested
within Nissenbaum’s description, as a way of identifying, and even-
tually anticipating, the expectations and values most significant to a
given individual. Although the term disposition may imply some-
thing that is fixed or preexisting, privacy disposition need not be
conceptualized as an enduring personality trait. Indeed, it would re-
quire empirical study to understand how the factors of habits and
reasons may shift over a lifetime or according to circumstance.
However, we hypothesize that privacy disposition is stable enough
to be useful and meaningful within some sets of defined circumstan-
ces (eg, with respect to biomedical information). Should future work
find that this latent construct is less stable than expected, other lan-
guage to describe it may be warranted (eg, use of the label privacy
perspective vs privacy disposition).
Limitations
This model is grounded in careful and systematic qualitative analy-
sis, but our method does have important limitations. First, the par-
ticipants we spoke to are not representative of the general
population, though we did work to speak to many different groups
of people who might have particular views of privacy and disclosure
of personal health data. The questions we asked of our respondents
focused on 2 main contexts—general online sharing and where
health data are disclosed. As with any qualitative data, this study
does not allow us to know the prevalence of the thoughts, ideas, and
concerns we observed in our data. However, this is the first phase of
a mixed-methods project. We seek to develop a psychometrically
sound instrument, through which we will be able to test both the
prevalence of similar sentiments and the reliability and validity of
our model.
CONCLUSION
We have suggested a conceptual model of privacy disposition based
on 3 insights that emerged from a qualitative study of how people
discuss attitudes and behaviors related to the disclosure of health in-
formation. First, privacy-related behavior is both contextual and ha-
bitual, implying that current disclosure decisions will likely resemble
previous disclosure decisions in a given context. However, behavior
is not necessarily consistent from one context to another. Second,
when people make decisions about information disclosure, they are
influenced by a range of motivations and deterrents that may include
risks and benefits but are often also based on subjective experiences.
Finally, privacy philosophies—ideas about “what privacy is”—can
also be motivations or deterrents that influence privacy decisions.
We have presented the qualitative data that prompted these insights
and used these data to illustrate the concept of privacy disposition as
a function of interpersonal habits, institutional habits, reasons for
sharing, and reasons against sharing.
We believe this model of privacy disposition has the potential to
inform applications and interventions in medical decision making,
research design, informed consent processes, and policy. If individu-
als’ privacy dispositions can be identified this could serve as a useful
tool in developing more “user-centered” recruitment strategies, pro-
cedures, communication tools, or informed consent processes for re-
search. For example, one could imagine this model forming the basis
of a tailored decision aid for use in research or even clinical decision
making where privacy-related issues are at stake. In the clinic, pro-
viders could use privacy disposition to anticipate and address points
of concern surrounding EHRs or information flows in hospitals and
clinics. If the rates of different types of privacy disposition can be
identified within populations, it could help identify ways to improve
the design of data-use policies to be more user-centered and respon-
sive to privacy-related expectations and values. It may also be possi-
ble to identify privacy concerns and values that are not currently
addressed in research and healthcare settings.
The model of privacy disposition has the potential to be applied
more generally to how individuals approach disclosure of personal
data beyond the context of medicine and health. Many of the topics
and themes identified here are related to an individual’s history and
demeanor toward privacy, such as generalized concerns about infor-
mation flows, privacy philosophies, or habits pertaining to mobile
app use. Therefore, while the instrument we are currently develop-
ing pertains to the disclosure of personal health information, future
work could use this model of privacy disposition to understand pat-
terns and expectations for disclosure of other types of information.
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